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Abstract
Extending Requirements Engineering modelling and formal analysis methodologies to cope
with Security Requirements has been a major effort in the past decade. Yet, only few works
describe complex case studies that show the ability of the informal and formal approaches to
cope with the level complexity required by compliance with ISO-17799 security management
requirements.
In this paper we present a comprehensive case study of the application of the Secure Tropos
RE methodology for the compliance to the Italian legislation on Privacy and Data Protection
by the University of Trento, leading to the definition and analysis of a ISO-17799-like security
management scheme.
1 Introduction
The last years have seen a major interest in the development of requirements engineering (RE)
methodologies which are able to capture security requirements. This has been marked by some
workshops (SREIS, SAPS, REHAS, et al.) and many papers and books [3, 17, 13, 19, 20, 22, 15, 21].
Some works have focused on modelling security and privacy concepts within existing RE frame-
works. For example Liu et al. [17] have used Tropos/i*, while Anton et al. [3] have proposed a
taxonomy of privacy requirements based on a goal oriented methodology. Others have modified the
RE constructs to account for special constructs for privacy & security. The most notable proposal
is Ju¨rjens’s UMLsec [15] where security tags are added to UML constructs. McDermott and Fox
introduce abuse cases [19]. An abuse case is an interaction between a system and one or more ac-
tors, where the results are harmful to the system, or one of the stakeholders of the system. Sindre
and Opdahl [20] define the concept of a misuse case, the inverse of a use case, which describes a
∗This is a revised and extended version of [18]
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function that the system should not allow. An analogous proposal has been put forward by van
Lamsweerde et al. [22] that introduce the notion of anti-goals, i.e., goals of the attacker that can be
refined. Giorgini et al. [13] present a framework extending Tropos in which security is considered
during the whole process of requirements analysis, and trust and delegation relationships are used
to model the interactions among actors involved in the system. Many of those proposals are backed
up by a number of formal analysis tools that can be used to support the requirement engineer in
the validation and verification of the analysis. For sake of example Jurien’s work [15] is based on
the AutoFOCUS case tool, van Lamsweerde’s approach is based on the KAOS, modal logic based,
reasoning tool [22], and Giorgini et al. work is based on Datalog [13].
Yet, what seems missing is the proof-of-concept ability to support the enterprise in the definition
of complex security policies as dictated by ISO security standards (e.g. ISO-17799 [14]) or complex
national Data Protection Legislation. Indeed, it should be possible to use the RE methodology to
derive the policy itself using its refinement mechanism and verify and validate the same policy using
the analysis tools available with the framework. In contrast, many papers presents the methodology
and supply some (toy) examples but only a handful describe complex case studies [4, 7, 11, 10]
which really copes with the complexity required by an ISO-17799 compliance.
In this paper we present a major case study of the application of the Secure Tropos requirements
engineering modelling and formal analysis methodology [13, 12] for the compliance to the Italian
legislation on Privacy and Data Protection by the University of Trento. In this report, we focus
on the key modelling aspects of the case study and refer to [13] for the introduction of the general
formal framework based on Datalog.
In the next section we briefly sketch the Italian and EU Data Protection Legislation and its
requirements (§2) and the information about the Univ. of Trento that is relevant to the law (§3).
Then we present the Secure Tropos RE methodology (§4) and we dig into the details of the case
study showing some examples of modelling actors (§5), modelling dependency and delegation (§6),
and refining one’s specification (§7). Finally we point out to a number of issues that have been
discovered by the analysis (§8), discuss related case studies and conclude (§9).
2 The Italian Data Protection Legislation
Many countries have recently promulgated a new privacy legislation spurred by increased con-
cerns over data protection. Table 1 gives a brief history of European and Italian legislation about
protection of personal data and privacy.
In Italy, data protection legislation is less than a decade old. Transposing the EC Directive
1995/46 into Italian law, the Italian Data Protection Act decreed that personal data are to be pro-
cessed “by respecting the rights, fundamental freedoms and dignity of natural persons, in particular
with regard to privacy and personal identity”. This goal was achieved by imposing to every data
controller a set of obligations:
• identification of all entities involved in data processing with their roles and responsibilities;
• assurance that the purpose of data processing is fair, lawful and legitimate;
• implementation of minimal precautionary security measures to reduce risks on data disclosure
were clearly defined with a later regulation enacted by Decree on July 28th, 1999.
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Table 1: Brief history of European and Italian data protection legislation
European Legislation
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (“Directive on privacy and electronic communications”).
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users rights relating to
electronic communications networks and services (“Universal Service Directive”).
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (“Framework Directive”).
Regulation No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on electronic commerce”).
Directive 1997/66/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector (It has been repealed and replaced by Directive 2002/58/EC).
Directive 1995/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
Italian Legislation
Legislative Decree No 196 of 30 June 2003 Italian Personal Data Protection Code.
Directive of Innovation and Technologies Department of 16 January 2002 on computer and telecommunications security in Public
Administration.
Legislative Decree No 467 of 28 December 2001 concerning corrective and additional provisions with regard to the protection of
personal data in accordance with Act No 127 of 24 March 2001.
Act No 325 of 3 November 2000 on provisions concerning the adoption of minimum security measures for personal data processing in
accordance with Act No 675 of 31 December 1996.
Legislative Decree No 281 of 30 July 1999 concerning provisions with regard to personal data processing for historical, statistical and
scientific research purposes.
Presidential Decree No 318 of 28 July 1999 Regulation on minimum security measures for personal data processing in accordance
with Act No 675 of 31 December 1996 (It has been repealed and replaced by Legislative Decree No. 196/2003).
Act No 675 of 31 December 1996 on protection of individuals and other subjects with regard to the processing of personal data (It
has been repealed and replaced by Legislative Decree No. 196/2003).
Innovation and Technologies Department enacted the Directive on Computer and Telecommu-
nications Security in Public Administration on January 16th, 2002. It was the first Directive of
Italian Government that forces the entire public administration process to assess the security of
their information systems and the start of the necessary activities to ensure their compliance to a
minimal security basis. This minimal security base is defined by six main features: security policy,
organization (roles and responsibilities), procedures, management and control, risk analysis and
staff training. It required the adoption of a procedure for computer security incidents management
and the creation of Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). The requirements were close
but not identical to the ISO standard 17799.
Later EU and Italian legislation systematized the norms on privacy and data protection. It
confirmed and integrated:
• the definitions of personal data, sensitive data, and data processing,
• the definitions of all entities involved in data processing, their roles and responsibilities (con-
troller, processor, operator, subject),
• the obligations relating to public and private data controllers with specific reference to the
legitimate purpose of data processing and the adoption of minimal precautionary security
measures to minimize the risks on data.
Skipping over specific ruling penalties and procedures, the law included a technical annex that
regulates the implementation of minimal precautionary security measures as authentication and
authorization system, antivirus, data backup and restore, and structure.
These measures had to be detailed into a “Documento Programmatico sulla Sicurezza” (DPS).
The DPS is a security policy document for the management of all aspects of security concerning
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- organization, technology and procedures - explicitly imposed as an obligation to data controllers
by the Data Protection Code. Every organization was supposed to draw up, update yearly and
obviously deploy a DPS. Table 3 shows an item-by-item comparison of the DPS enacted by the
University of Trento and ISO-17799.
3 University of Trento: Information System & Organization
Personal data are processed within University for institutional purposes: education and research.
The University has enforced the Data Protection Act through a Privacy Internal Regulation on
January 14th, 2002 that transposed general regulations into its internal organization: it sets the
responsibility line relating to personal data processing from data controller, the Chancellor, through
data processors identified with Faculty Deans, Heads of Department and Central Directorate Man-
agers down to data processing operators. Every data processor is responsible on behalf of the
controller to accomplish the obligations relating to personal data processed within its own organi-
zation, supported by the ICT Directorate with regard to the adoption of the minimal precautionary
security measures for electronic data processing.
Central Administrative Directorates (where the bulk of data processing is done) manage and
coordinate all activities to support education and research. The Data Controller is identified with
the Chancellor and all administrative executive directors are Data Processor within their own
Directorate. Within the University, we have 10 Directorates: Chancellorship, General, Governance
Relations, HR, Budget and Finance, Student Affairs and University Relations, ICT, Facilities
Services, Library, Rovereto Administrative1.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has a special coordinating role within University on behalf
of the Chancellor to accomplish all obligations related to personal data processing. The Chief
Information Officer (CIO) is responsible for the adoption of the minimal and suitable precautionary
security measures for electronic personal data processing.
The ICT Directorate manages the IT systems. The substructures in charge of Information
Systems and Network, manage all central information services and network infrastructure whereas
the local systems and services are managed by ICT local garrisons. Based on the University Privacy
Internal Regulation, the CIO is responsible to draw up and to update the DPS and to implement the
minimal and suitable security measures. Furthermore, he designates Database Security Operators
and Network Security Operators within central structure and local garrisons.
Williams [23] proposes a maturity model to establish rankings for security in an organization
(Table 2). Matched against this scale, the University of Trento can be ranked between 3 and 4. In
particular 4(a) is not yet enforced whereas 4(b) and 4(c) are (almost entirely) enforced2.
4 Security-Aware Tropos
Tropos [8] is an agent-oriented software development methodology, tailored to describe both the
organization and the system. In Tropos, one can capture not only the what or the how, but also the
why a piece of software is developed. This allows a more refined analysis of the system’s functional
requirements, and also of the non-functional requirements such as security.
1The University has a subsidiary in another city.
2Security awareness briefings are restricted to technical staff whereas non-technical staff only receive notifications
in occasion of major virus and worm attacks. Intrusion testing is still amateurish.
4
Table 2: Maturity of information risk management
Maturity Level Description
0 Non-Existent: management processes are not applied at all
(a) No risk assessment of processes or business decisions. The organization does not consider the business impact
associated with security vulnerabilities. Risk management has not been identified as relevant to IT solutions
and services;
(b) The organization does not recognize the need for IT security. Responsibilities and accountabilities for security
are not assigned. Measures supporting the management of IT security are not implemented. There is no
IT security reporting or response process for IT security breaches. No recognizable security administration
processes exist;
(c) No understanding of the risks, vulnerabilities and threats to IT operations or service continuity by management.
1 Initial/Ad-Hoc: processes are ad-hoc and disorganized
(a) The organization considers IT risks in an ad-hoc manner, without following defined processes or policies. In-
formal project based risk assessment is used;
(b) The organization recognizes the need for IT security, but security awareness depends on the individual. IT
security is reactive and not measured. IT security breaches invoke “finger pointing” responses if detected,
because responsibilities are unclear. Responses to IT security breaches are unpredictable;
(c) Responsibilities for continuous service are informal, with limited authority. Management is becoming aware of
the risks related to and the need for continuous service.
2 Repeatable but intuitive: processes follows a regular pattern
(a) There is an emerging understanding that IT risks are important and need to be considered. Some approach to
risk assessment exists, but the process is still immature and developing;
(b) Responsibilities and accountabilities for IT security are assigned to an IT security coordinator with no man-
agement authority. Security awareness is fragmented and limited. Security information is generated, but is
not analyzed. Security tends to respond reactively to incidents and by adopting third-party offerings, without
addressing the specific needs of the organization. Security policies are being developed, but inadequate skills
and tools are still being used. IT security reporting is incomplete or misleading;
(c) Responsibility for continuous service is assigned. Fragmented approach to continuous service. Reporting on
system availability is incomplete and does not take business impact into account.
3 Defined Process: processes are documented and communicated
(a) An organization-wide risk management policy defines when and how to conduct risk assessments. Risk assess-
ment follows a defined process that is documented and available to all staff;
(b) Security awareness exists and is promoted by management through formalized briefings. IT security procedures
are defined and fit into a structure for security policies and procedures. Responsibilities for IT security are
assigned, but not consistently enforced. An IT security plan exists, driving risk analysis and security solutions.
IT security reporting is IT focused, rather than business focused. Ad-hoc intrusion testing is performed.
(c) Management communicates consistently the need for continuous service. High-availability components and
system redundancy are being applied piecemeal. An inventory of critical systems and components is rigorously
maintained.
4 Managed and Measurable: processes are monitored and measured
(a) The assessment of risk is a standard procedure and exceptions would be noticed by IT management. It is likely
that IT risk management is a defined management function with senior level responsibility. Senior management
and IT management have determined the levels of risk that the organization will tolerate and have standard
measures for risk/return ratios;
(b) Responsibilities for IT security are clearly assigned, managed and enforced. IT security risk and impact anal-
ysis is consistently performed. Security policies and practices are completed with specific security baselines.
Security awareness briefings, user identification, authentication and authorization have become mandatory and
standardized. Intrusion testing is standardized and leads to improvements. Cost/benefit analysis, is increas-
ingly used. Security processes are coordinated with the overall organization security function and reporting is
linked to business objectives;
(c) Responsibilities and standards for continuous service are enforced. System redundancy practices, including use
of high-availability components, are being consistently deployed.
5 Optimized-best practices are followed and automated
(a) Risk assessment has developed to the stage where a structured, organization- wide process is enforced, followed
regularly and well managed;
(b) IT security is a joint responsibility of business and IT management and integrated with corporate business ob-
jectives. Security requirements are clearly defined, optimized and included in a verified security plan. Functions
are integrated with applications at the design stage and end users are increasingly accountable for managing
security. IT security reporting provides early warning of changing and emerging risk, using automated ac-
tive monitoring approaches for critical systems. Incidents are promptly addressed with formalized incident
response procedures supported by automated tools. Periodic security assessments evaluate the effectiveness
of implementation of the security plan. Information on new threats and vulnerabilities is systematically col-
lected and analyzed, and adequate mitigating controls are promptly communicated and implemented. Intrusion
testing, root cause analysis of security incidents and proactive identification of risk is the basis for continuous
improvements. Security processes and technologies integrated organization wide.
(c) Continuous service plans and business continuity plans are integrated, aligned and routinely maintained. Buy-in
for continuous service needs is secured from vendors and major suppliers.
Here we use Security-Enhanced Tropos [13]. We have the concepts of actor, goal, soft goal,
task, resource and social relationships for defining the obligations of actors to other actors. Actors
have strategic goals and intentions within the system or the organization. A goal represents the
strategic interests of an actor. A task specifies a particular course of action that produces a
desired effect, and can be executed in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a physical or
an informational entity. The relationships we have considered so far are functional dependency,
5
ownership, provisioning, trust, and delegation of permission. A functional dependency between
two actors means that the dependee will take responsibility for fulfilling the functional goal of a
depender. The owner of a service has full authority concerning access and usage of his services, and
he can also delegate this authority to other actors. Delegation marks a formal passage between the
actors. In contrast, trust marks simply a social relationship that is not formalized by a “contract”
between the actors: such as a digital credential or a signed piece of paper attributing permission.
Various activities contribute to the acquisition of a first requirement model, to its refinement
into subsequent models:
Actor modeling, which consists of identifying and analyzing both the actors of the environment
and the system’s actors and agents;
Dependency modeling, which consists of identifying actors which depend on one another for
goal be achieved, plans to be performed, and resources to be furnished, and actors which are
able to provide goal, plans, and resources.
Trust modeling, which consists of identifying actors which trust other actor for goal, plans, and
resources, and actors which own goal, plans, and resources.
Delegation modeling, which consists of identifying actors which delegate to other actors the
permission on goals, plans, and resources.
Goal refinement, which consists of refining requirements and eliciting new relations. This is
standard in Goal-Oriented Methodologies [8].
A graphical representation of the model obtained following the first four modeling activities is
given through three different kinds of actor diagrams: functional dependency model, trust model,
and trust management implementation. In these diagrams, actors are represented as circles; goals,
tasks and resources are respectively represented as ovals, hexagons and rectangles.
Once the stakeholders and their goals and social relations have been identified, the analysis
tries to enrich the model with more details. Goal refinement aims to analyze any goals of each
actor, and is conducted from the perspective of the actor itself by using AND/OR decomposition.
A graphical representation of goal refinement is given through goal diagrams. The outcome of this
phase is a set of social relations among actors, defined incrementally by performing goal refinement
on each goal, until all goals have been refined. Goal refinement builds goal hierarchies where lower
goals are more specific and are motivated by goals higher in the hierarchy.
5 Modelling Actors
The first activity in the early requirements phase is actors’ modeling. This phase consists of
identifying and analyzing the application domain stakeholders and their intentions as social actor
which want to achieve goals.
In our example we can start by informally listing some of them. The following definitions3 apply
and shall be used in this paper:
3See Article 2 “Definitions” of EU Directive 95/46/EC.
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Data Controller is the natural or legal person which determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data. In the University, the data controller is identified with Chancellor
(as the post-holder is also the legal representative of the University).
Data Processor is a natural or legal person which monitors personal data processing on behalf
of the controller. In the University, based on the enacted regulations, data processors are
identified with:
• Faculty Deans;
• Heads of Department;
• Central Directorate Managers, and in particular with:
– Chief Executive Officer (CEO);
– Chief Information Officer (CIO).
Data Processing Operator is the human appointed by the data controller or processor to per-
form the operations related to the data processing or to manage and maintain the information
systems and services. At University of Trento, these are identified with:
• Personal Data Processing Operator;
• Database Security Operator;
• Network Security Operator.
Data Subject is the natural or legal person to whom the personal data are related. In the Secure
Tropos terminology, this is the legitimate owner of the data.
CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) is composed by:
• the staff of ATI Network that manages the network infrastructure and services of the
University;
• the Information Security Office Manager;
• the CIO.
To be more precise CERT includes a member in charge of security issues for every major ICT
service center in the University.
In the underlying formal model based on datalog instances of actors are represented as constants
satisfying atomic predicates for actors’ types (e.g. being Chancellor) and binary predicates are used
to link agents and goals.
6 Modelling Dependencies and Delegation
The analysis proceeds introducing the functional dependencies and the delegation of permission
between actors and the consequent integrated security and functional requirements. Figure 1(a)
and Figure 1(b) show the functional dependency model and the trust management implementation.
We use delegation of permission (Dp) to model the actual transfer of rights in some form (e.g. a
digital certificate, a signed paper, etc.), and Df for functional dependency.
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Figure 1: Actor Diagrams
In the functional dependency model, Chancellor is associated with a single relevant goal: guar-
antee correct data processing execution, while CEO has an associated goal compliance with legal
requirements. Along similar lines, Data Processor and Data Processing Operator want to comply
with internal orders and regulation, while CIO, wants to guarantee law enforcement. Finally, the
diagram includes some functional dependencies: Data Subject depends on Chancellor for privacy
protection goal; Chancellor depends on Data Processor and Data Processing Operator to perform
data processing ; and, in turn, Data Processor depends on Data Processing Operator for it.
In the trust management implementation, following the current practice Chancellor delegates
permissions to perform data processing to Data Processor and Data Processing Operator. In turn,
Data Processor delegates permissions to perform data processing to Data Processing Operator.
At this stage, the analysis already reveals a number of pitfalls in the actual document template
provided by the ministry’s agency. The most notable one is the absolute absence of functional
dependencies between the Chancellor and the CEO, who is actually the one who runs the admin-
istration. Such functional dependency is present in the Universities statutes, but not here (an
apparently unrelated document).
Another missing part in the trust management implementation is the delegation of permission
from the data subject. This can be also automatically spotted with the techniques developed in
[13]. Somehow paradoxically (for a document template enacted in fulfillment of a Data Protection
Act) the process of acquisition of data (and the relative authorization) is neither mentioned nor
forseen. In practice this gap is solved by the University by a blanket authorization: in all the paper
or electronic data collection steps a signature is required to authorize the processing of data in
compliance with the privacy legislation.
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Figure 2: Functional Dependency Model for Chancellor
7 Goal Refinement
A first example of the goal refinement is given by the goal diagram depicted in Figure 2 for the
Chancellor. The goal guarantee correct data processing execution is decomposed into distribute
data processing and determine executive orders. We call this a “AND-decomposition”. The goal
distribute data processing is decomposed (OR-decomposition) into two subgoals: outsourcing and
distribute to internal staff.
The security requirements of an organization outsourcing the management and control of all or
some of its information system is addressed in a contract agreed between the parties. For example,
the contract should address: how the legal requirements are to be met, e.g. data protection leg-
islation; what arrangements will be in place to ensure that all parties involved in the outsourcer,
including subcontractors, are aware of their security responsibilities; how the integrity and confi-
dentiality of the organization’s business assets are to be maintained and tested; etc. In a nutshell
the contract should say that the goal guarantee correct data processing execution is also fulfilled
by the service supplier. The contract should allow the security requirements and procedures to
be expanded in a security management plan to be agreed between the two parties. Following
these requirements, the goal outsourcing is AND-decomposed into identify data controller, identify
responsibilities and tasks, and expect declaration of security compliance.
The other hand, the goal distribute to internal staff is decomposed into distribute responsibilities
and provide data to other offices of the university and to press. Distribute responsibilities consists
into define responsibilities for data processor and appoint data processor. Since security roles and
responsibilities should include implementing or maintaining security policy as well as any specific
responsibilities for the protection of particular assets, or for the execution of particular security
processes or activities, the goal determine executive orders is AND-decomposed into five subgoals:
data processing objectives, data processing procedures, choice of processing instruments and tools,
security profile, and manage internal directives for which Chancellor depends on CEO. Note here
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Figure 3: Functional Dependency Model for CIO
the gap: everything is “formally” decided by Chancellor and only the final executive regulations are
delegated to the CEO. Only in theory objectives, procedures, processing instruments and security
profile are defined by Chancellor, whereas they are just enacted by him.
A second example, in Figure 3, shows the goal analysis for CIO, relative to the goal guarantee law
enforcement. This goal is decomposed into fulfill administrative and technical duties and manage
security measures. The goal fulfill administrative and technical duties is decomposed into three
goals: manage user access profile for which Data Processor depends on CIO, check activities’
evolvement, and census data processing for which CIO depends on Data Processor. The goal
manage user access profile is decomposed into create user access profile and guarantee authenticate
connections. The goal create user access profile is decomposed into update authorization database,
generate ID, generate and retrieve password,4 and communicate user access profile for which Data
Processing Operator depends on CIO. The goal manage security measures is decomposed into
define security measures, monitor security measures, verify security measures, and convey security
measures for which Data Processor depends on CIO. Essentially this map the formal requirements
that a policy document should be approved by management, published and communicated, as
appropriate, to all employees.
The goal diagram in Figure 4 shows the trust management implementation for Chancellor
with respect to goal guarantee correct data processing execution. In particular, it points out that
Supplier delegates a signed declaration of security compliance to Chancellor where Supplier engages
in honoring and enforcing the undertaken responsibilities. This map the formal requirements that
the University has security policies that requires adherence to several necessary precautions in order
to maintain privacy protection in behalf of Data Subject. Further, Chancellor delegates mail within
instructions to Data Processor and executive orders list to CEO.
Figure 5 shows the trust management implementation for CIO. The diagram displays that Data
Processor delegates data processing list to CIO for census. Further, CIO delegates ID, password
and user access profile to Data Processing Operator.
4The procedure also includes some fuzzy steps on something that is a security anathema (helping users who forgot
their password) but a fairly frequent problem.
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The model has been further refined down to the the various offices and members of staff until it
could be matched one-one with the actual DPS. Next, we present other diagrams for the some actors
involved in the system. Figures 6 and 7 show, respectively, functional dependency model and trust
management implementation for Data Processor relative to the goal comply with internal orders and
regulation. Figures 8 and 9 show, respectively, the goal refinement of the functional dependency
model and the trust management implementation for Data Processing Operator, relative to the
goal comply with internal orders and regulation, and for Database Security Operator, relative to
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Figure 6: Functional Dependency Model for Data Processor
the goal manage and maintain ICT instruments and tools.
The goal diagrams in Figure 10(a) and 10(b) show, respectively, functional dependency model
and trust management implementation for Data Subject. The functional dependency model reveals
that Data Subject depends on Chancellor to get informative, and that Chancellor depends on Data
Subject for the consensus needed for performing data processing. The trust implementation model
displays that Chancellor delegate informative to Data Subject, and Data Subject delegate consensus
to Chancellor.
Figure 11 shows the goal refinement for CEO, relative to the goal compliance with legal require-
ments. The goal diagrams in Figure 12 shows the functional dependency model for CERT, relative
to the goal co-ordinate response activities for security incidents, and for Information Security Of-
fice Manager, relative to the goal manage information security and privacy matters. The trust
implementation model for CEO and CERT is not shown since it is not defined in the DPS.
8 Adequacy and Analysis of the Model
The primitives suggested for Secure Tropos were sufficient to cope with the complexity of a real
ISO-17799-like case study and the methodology allowed to pinpoint many issues.
For example, the first observation is that a trust model is not considered in the required proce-
dures and documents. Trust relations are implicitly defined in the employment contract that actors
draw up with the University. In absence of such model, some of the properties proposed in [13]
cannot be verified since trust is at the base of such framework. Note also that, in according with
the Code, data subjects own their personal data. In [13], we suggest to check if employees who
are entitled to access to Personal data, have previously gotten the permission from data subjects
for them. In above models, this is not verified since there is not delegation from data subjects to
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Figure 7: Trust Management Implementation for Data Processor
employees for personal data. Essentially we only have a blanket authorization.
Further, DPS defines only objectives and responsibilities for the entities involved into the or-
ganization, but does not identify who is really able to provide services. This entails that some
relations among entities could miss. For example, looking at Figure 3 and 5, the CIO has the
responsibilities to manage user access profile. In practice, he delegates the execution of this goal
to an employee of the ICT Directorate that generates IDs and passwords, and then delegates them
to data processing operators. Consequently, it is not possible capture requirements of availability
unless an explicit model of the functional requirements is also given. For instance, we cannot verify
whether data subjects delegate their personal data only to someone that is able to provide the
requested service. This clashes with privacy principles and, specifically, with the notion of “limited
collection”: the collection of personal information should be limited to the minimum necessary for
accomplishing the specified service.
Notice that this is not a problem of the University of Trento, but rather of the entire security
assessment procedure in the state of the art: unless the ISO-17799 policy (or its equivalent DPS)
is matched by a description of the functional goals of the organization it is not possible to con-
clude whether access is fair or respect least privileges principles. The same problem affects EPAL
proposals [5, 6] and other privacy proposals in the literature [1, 2, 9, 16].
The most painful (and so far not formally analyzed part) is the treatment of manual non-ICT
procedures. This difficulty steams from two main sources. The first one is that non-ICT procedures
are often not completely formalized since there is no need for “programming” and “debugging” a
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Figure 8: Functional Dependency Model for Data Processing Operator
human. This does not means that offices do not follow standard procedures but rather that these
procedures are somehow “embedded” in the organization or the “office distributed knowledge”. In
absence of fully formalized functional procedures it is difficult to define the corresponding autho-
rization and trust management procedures.
9 Related Case Studies and Conclusions
The last years have seen an increasing awareness that security and privacy play a key role in system
development and deployment. This awareness has been matched by a number of research proposals
on incorporating security and privacy considerations into the mainstream requirement and software
engineering methodologies. Yet, only few papers describe complex case studies.
Becker et al. [7] use Cassandra to model and analyze an access control policy for a national
electronic health record system. The background of this case study is the British National Health
Service’s current plan to develop an electronic data spine that will contain medical data for all
patients in England. The proposed policies contain a total of 310 rules and define 58 parameterized
roles.
In [3], Anto`n et al. introduces a privacy goal taxonomy and reports the analysis of 23 Internet
privacy policies for companies in three health care industries: pharmaceutical, health insurance and
on-line drugstores. The identified goals are used to discover inner internal conflicts within privacy
policies and conflicts with the corresponding websites and their manner of manage customers’
personal data.
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Figure 10: Diagrams for Data Subject
A study of the certification of information security management systems based on specifications
promulgated by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs is proposed in [11]. In particular, this work
shows the ability of Taiwan’s information security management systems to meet the requirements
proposed in international standards. In [10], authors analyze the knowledge and skills required
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for auditing the certification procedures for asset, threat, and vulnerability. They recognize that
reducing risks is the target of information security management system protection mechanism.
Thus, risk assessment is need to analyze the threats to and vulnerabilities of information systems
and the potential impact of harm that the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability would
have on an agency’s operations and assets.
In this paper we have shown the Secure Tropos methodology at work on a real-life comprehensive
case study encompassing on ISO-17799 security management policy. The proposed constructs and
methodology were up the challenge and revealed a number of pitfalls, especially when the formal
analysis techniques were applied.
Future work is in the full automated analysis of the policy at the level of individual staff members
processing data.
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A Comparing ISO-17799 and DPS 3.0
Table 3: Comparing ISO-17799 and DPS 3.0
ISO/IEC 17799 2000 DPS 3.0 according Italian D.Lgs n.196/2003
“Code of Practice for Information Security Manage-
ment”
“Programmatic Security Document”
INTRODUCTION 1 INTRODUCTION
what is information security?, why information security is
needed, how to establish security requirements, assessing secu-
rity risks, selecting controls, information security starting point,
critical success factors, developing your own guidelines
1 SCOPE 3 SCOPE
2 REFERENCES 2 REFERENCES
3 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Not implemented
4 SECURITY POLICY
4.1 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY
4.1.1 Information security policy document 4 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY
4.1.2 Review and evaluation
5 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
5.1 INFORMATION SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
5.1.1 Management information security forum
5.1.2 Information security co-ordination 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
5.1.3 Allocation of information security responsibilities 6.3.1 Actors provided for law
5.1.4 Authorization process for information processing facilities 6.3.2 ICT Directorate
5.1.5 Specialist information security advice
5.1.6 Co-operation between organizations Limited to privacy
5.1.7 Independent review of information security
5.2 SECURITY OF THIRD PARTY ACCESS
5.2.1 Identification of risks from third party access
5.2.2 Security requirements in third party contracts 6.3.8 Security requirements in outsourcing contracts
5.3 OUTSOURCING
5.3.1 Security requirements in outsourcing contracts
6 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL 5 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL
6.1 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ASSETS - Annex 1 Facsimile for inventory of Server Systems
6.1.1 Inventory of assets - Annex 2 Facsimile for inventory of Software Systems
6.2 INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION - Annex 3 Facsimile for inventory of data processing
6.2.1 Classification guidelines - Annex 4 Data processing census (D.Lgsn.196/2003)
6.2.2 Information labeling and handling - Annex 5 Asset classification and control
7 PERSONNEL SECURITY 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
7.1 SECURITY IN JOB DEFINITION AND RESOURCING 6.3.1 Actors defined by law
7.1.1 Including security in job responsibilities 6.3.2 ICT Directorate
7.1.2 Personnel screening and policy
7.1.3 Confidentiality agreements Limited to privacy
7.1.4 Terms and conditions of employment
7.2 USER TRAINING 8 USER TRAINING
7.2.1 Information security education and training
7.3 SECURITY INCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS
7.3.1 Reporting security incidents 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
7.3.2 Reporting security weaknesses 6.3.3 CERT@Unitn.it
7.3.3 Reporting software malfunctions 6.3.4 Management of security incidents and malfunctions
7.3.4 Learning from incidents
7.3.5 Disciplinary process
8 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
8.1 SECURE AREAS
8.1.1 Physical security perimeter
8.1.2 Physical entry controls
8.1.3 Securing offices, rooms and facilities
8.1.4 Working in secure areas
8.1.5 Isolated delivery and loading areas
8.2 EQUIPMENT SECURITY 6.1 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
8.2.1 Equipment siting and protection 6.1.1 Secure areas
8.2.2 Power supplies 6.1.2 Equipment security
8.2.3 Cabling security
8.2.4 Equipment maintenance
8.2.5 Security of equipment off-premises
8.2.6 Secure disposal or re-use of equipment
8.3 GENERAL CONTROLS
8.3.1 Clear desk and clear screen policy
8.3.2 Removal of property
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9 COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONS MAN-
AGEMENT
9.1 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILI-
TIES
9.1.1 Documented operating procedures 6.2 OPERATIONAL SECURITY
9.1.2 Operational change control 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
9.1.3 Incident management procedures
9.1.4 Segregation of duties
9.1.5 Separation of development and operational facilities
9.1.6 External facilities management
9.2 SYSTEM PLANNING AND ACCEPTANCE
9.2.1 Capacity planning Not implemented
9.2.2 System acceptance
9.3 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
9.3.1 Controls against malicious software 6.2.3 Controls against malicious software
9.4 HOUSEKEEPING
9.4.1 Information back-up 6.2.4 Information back-up and recovery
9.4.2 Operator logs 6.3.6 Procedures for information back-up and recovery
9.4.3 Fault logging
9.5 NETWORK MANAGEMENT
9.5.1 Network controls 6.2.2 Network controls
9.6 MEDIA HANDLING AND SECURITY
9.6.1 Management of removable computer media 6.1.3 Management of removable computer media and system doc-
umentation
9.6.2 Disposal of media
9.6.3 Information handling procedures
9.6.4 Security of system documentation
9.7 EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION
9.7.1 Exchange policy
9.7.2 Exchange agreements
9.7.3 Physical media in transit Not implemented
9.7.4 Electronic commerce
9.7.5 Electronic communications
9.7.6 On-Line Transactions
9.7.7 Office information systems
9.7.8 Publicly available systems
10 ACCESS CONTROL
10.1 BUSINESS REQUIREMENT FOR ACCESS CONTROL
10.1.1 Access control policy
10.2 USER ACCESS MANAGEMENT
10.2.1 User registration
10.2.2 Privilege management
10.2.3 User password management
10.2.4 Review of user access rights
10.3 USER RESPONSIBILITIES
10.3.1 Password use
10.3.2 Unattended user equipment
10.4 NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 6.2 OPERATIONAL SECURITY
10.4.1 Policy on use of network services 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
10.4.2 Enforced path 6.2.1 Access control (Authentication and Authorization)
10.4.3 User authentication for external connections 6.3.5 User access management (Authentication and Authoriza-
tion)
10.4.4 Node authentication
10.4.5 Remote diagnostic port protection
10.4.6 Segregation in networks
10.4.7 Network connection control
10.4.8 Network routing control
10.4.9 Security of network services
10.5 OPERATING SYSTEM ACCESS CONTROL
10.5.1 Automatic terminal identification
10.5.2 Terminal log-on procedures
10.5.3 User identification and authentication
10.5.4 Password management system
10.5.5 Use of system utilities
10.5.6 Duress alarm to safeguard users
10.5.7 Terminal time-out
10.5.8 Limitation of connection time
10.6 APPLICATION ACCESS CONTROL
10.6.1 Information access restriction
10.6.2 Sensitive system isolation
10.7 MONITORING SYSTEM ACCESS AND USE
10.7.1 Event logging Not structured (though individual logs are taken)
10.7.2 Monitoring system use
10.7.3 Clock synchronization
10.8 MOBILE COMPUTING AND TELEWORKING
10.8.1 Mobile computing Not implemented
10.8.2 Teleworking
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11 SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE
11.1 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF SYSTEMS
11.1.1 Security requirements analysis and specification
11.2 SECURITY IN APPLICATION SYSTEMS
11.2.1 Input data validation
11.2.2 Control of internal processing
11.2.3 Message authentication
11.2.4 Output data validation
11.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONTROLS 6.2 OPERATIONAL SECURITY
11.3.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
11.3.2 Encryption 6.2.5 Software controls
11.3.3 Digital signatures
11.3.4 Non-repudiation services (non-repudiation services will be implemented
11.3.5 Key management in the near future!)
11.4 SECURITY OF SYSTEM FILES
11.4.1 Control of operational software
11.4.2 Protection of system test data
11.4.3 Access control to program source library
11.5 SECURITY IN DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT PRO-
CESSES
11.5.1 Change control procedures
11.5.2 Technical review of operating system changes
11.5.3 Restrictions on changes to software packages
11.5.4 Covert channels and Trojan code
11.5.5 Outsourced software development
12 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY
12.1 ASPECTS OF BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 6.2.4 Information back-up and recovery
12.1.1 Business continuity management process 6.3.6 Procedures for information back-up and recovery
12.1.2 Business continuity and impact analysis
12.1.3 Writing and implementing continuity plans
12.1.4 Business continuity planning framework
12.1.5 Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business continuity
plans
13 COMPLIANCE - Annex 7 Description of security policy and technical compli-
ance (D.Lgs. N.196/2003)
13.1 COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS - Annex 8 Description of security policy and technical compli-
ance (D.P.R.N.318/1999)
13.1.1 Identification of applicable legislation
13.1.2 Intellectual property rights (IPR) Receival of national law, limited to privacy:
13.1.3 Safeguarding of organizational records - privacy
13.1.4 Data protection and privacy of personal information - cryptography
13.1.5 Prevention of misuse of information processing facilities - digital signatures
13.1.6 Regulation of cryptographic controls - copyright
13.1.7 Collection of evidence - illegal activities and disciplinary action
- collection of evidence
13.2 REVIEWS OF SECURITY POLICY AND TECHNICAL
COMPLIANCE
7. REVIEWS OF SECURITY POLICY AND TECHNI-
CAL COMPLIANCE
13.2.1 Compliance with security policy - Annex 6 Facsimile for reviews of security policy and technical
compliance
13.2.2 Technical compliance checking
13.3 SYSTEM AUDIT CONSIDERATIONS
13.3.1 System audit controls
13.3.2 Protection of system audit tools
21
